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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
L. P. BENTLEY and CLARICE E. ) 
B~nn, > 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
Respondents} 
vs. } 
) Case No. 18241 
LOWELL E. POTTER, ) 
) 
Defendant, ) 
Appellant, ) 
APPELLANT LOWELL E. POTTER'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action which was commenced in the the Third 
Judicial District Court, based upon the alleged breach of a 
Mining Lease executed between the parties on the 11th day of 
May, 1978, and for the sum of one thousand dollars 
($1,000.00) as a result of the Plaintiff-Respondent having 
sold a truck to Mining and Energy Leasing corporation. 
Defendant-Appellant counterclaimed for assessment work which 
had been performed, and for the value of a trailer taken by 
the Plaintiff-Respondent. 
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DISPOSITION I'N THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried before the Honorable Homer F. 
Wilkinson on the 13th day of October, 1981. On the 18th day 
of December, 1981, the court entered a memorandum decision 
stating that Plaintiff-Respondent was entitled to a total 
judgment against the Defendant-Appellant for $19~375.46 and 
that Defendant-Appellant was entitled to a credit against 
said amount o·f $5, 120. 00; thereby granting Judgment to the 
Plaintiff-Respondent in the sum of· $14, 255. 46. 
On the 11th day of January, 1982 the court entered 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and a Judgment 
against the Plaintiff-Respondent in the sum of $19,375.46. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-Appellant seeks a reversal of the lower 
courts Judgment and an order stating that Plaintiff-
Respondent has no standing for the bringing of an action 
against Defendant-Appellant, and that the contract in 
question was void or voidable. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On May 11, 1978 Plaintiff-Respondent and Defendant-
Appellant entered into a Mining Lease and Option; whereupon 
Plaintiff-Respondent was the Lessor and Defendant-Appellant 
-2-
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was the Lessee (Exhibit 1). Section I of said Lease Agree-
ment at page 2 indicated: 
"The rights hereby granted include the lodes, 
veins, beds, dumps, and other occurances of the 
lease minerals within the boundry of the lease 
premises." (emphasis added). 
However Plaintiff-Respondent never had an interest in the 
lode claims and only attempted to perfect the placer claims 
(Exhibit 14). Plaintiff-Respondent acknowledged that he was 
aware of the difference between a lode and placer claim. 
(Transcript page 46 lines 19 through 25, page 48 and 49 
lines 21 through 25 and 1 through 17). 
Section VIII of the Lease at page 6 (Exhibit 1) , in 
connection with termination of the Lease Agreement, requires 
the Lessor to tender notice to the Lessee, and states: 
" . • if such default continues for a period of 
60 days after written notice of such default has 
been given by the lessor's to the lessee then in 
such event this lease shall be terminable." 
Plaintiff-Respondent acknowledged that he never made 
demand for payment under said Lease Agreement (Transcript 
page 16, lines 19 through 21) and that the methods employed 
in doing the assessment work, and exploration on the property 
in question were acceptable to the Plaintiff-Respondent 
(Page 38, lines 16 through 25, and page 39 lines 1 through 
5), and at the first time Plaintiff-Respondent indicated 
that there should be a termination of the Lease Agreement in 
question, or that the work was improper was on March 5, 1980 
(Transcript page 65 lines 10 through 18), which was after 
the date suit had been filed by Plaintiff-Respondent. 
-~-
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That Plaintiff-Respondent initiated suit against the 
Defendant-Appellant on November 29, 1979, and a summons and 
Complaint was served upon the Defendant-Appellant on December 
14, 1979, and that on March 5, 1980 Plaintiff-Respondent 
filed a Notice of Termination (Exhibit 13). 
The Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, a judge of the Third 
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, found that the August 10, 1979 letter (Exhibit 2) 
was a notice of default pursuant to the lease agreement 
(Paragraph 5 of the Findings of Fact) , and that the filing 
of the legal action on the 29th day of November, 1979 was 
written notice of termination of the Lease sufficient to 
grant standing to the Plaintiff-Respondent for the bringing 
of an action. The Plaintiff-Respondent was awarded judgment 
against the Defendant-Appellant based on a termination and 
damages under the Lease. 
At the time of the placement of the overburden complain-
ed of by Plaintiff-Respondent it appears that Plaintiff-
Respondent was aware of the placement of the overburden and 
made regular trips throughout the area (Transcript page 54 
line 20 and 21, page 176 lines 18 through 20, page 177 lines 
23 through 25, page 182 lines 17 through 18 pages 174, 176, 
177, and 182), and the court found pursuant to paragraph 13 
of the findings of fact that Plaintiff-Respondent was 
present during the placement of the overburden. 
The Plaintiff-Respondent acknowledged (Transcript page 
71 and 72) that prior to an execution of the lease in 
-4-
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question with the Defendant-Appellant that a former co-owner 
of the claims, a Mr. Tony Fisher was removed from the 
claims, and a new co-owner Mrs. Clarice E. Bentley was 
placed upon the claims in question without the filing of any 
notification to the B.L.M •• 
Plaintiff-Respondent sold a.truck for a total purchase 
price of $5,000.00 to Mining and Energy Leasing Corporation, 
a Utah corporation (Exhibit 15, transcript pages 81 through 
84), and that there was a balance due and owing as a result 
of said sale in the sum of $1,000.00. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LEASE AGREEMENT CANNOT BE IN DEFAULT UNTIL WRITTEN 
NOTICE HAS BEEN GIVEN, PURSUANT TO THE TERMS OF THE LEASE; 
AND PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT HAS NO STANDING TO SUE UNTIL SAID 
NOTICE HAS BEEN GIVEN. 
The Lease Agreement in question, under Section VIII, 
Termination, at page 6 states: 
"If, at any time, the Lessee shall be in default 
in the performance of any of the terms and condi-
tions of this Lease on the part of the Lessee to 
be performed, • • • and if such default continues 
for a period of 60 days after written notice of 
_c:;._ 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
such default has been given by the Lessor to the 
Lessee, then, and in such event, this Lease shall 
be terminable. Such termination shall -be effec-
tive as of the date of the Lessors' written notice 
to the Lessee terminating the same." (emphasis 
added). 
In the action presently before the court it appears 
undisputed that Plaintiff-Respondent made no demand upon 
Defendant-Appellant for performance of the Lease in que_s-
tion, or notified the Defendant-Appellant that the lease was 
in default, (Transcript page 16 lines 19 and 20, and page 65 
lines 14 through 18). The purported default or termination 
of the Lease pursuant to the August 10, 1979 letter (Exhibit 
2) , is in actuality not a notice of a default of the Lease, 
and is contrary to the provisions of the Lease by the 
granting of ten days notice which is contrary to the pro-
visions of Section VIII of the Lease Agreement. A perusal 
of the record in question will indicate that the Complaint 
was signed by the Plaintiff-Respondent's attorney on November 
29, 1979 and was served upon the Defendant-Appellant on 
December 14, 1979. It is also undisputed from the record, 
and the testimony of the Plaintiff-Respondent that the first 
notice of default or termination tendered to the Defendant-
Appellant, was tendered by Plaintiff-Respondents attorney 
after suit had been filed, and was tendered on March S, 
1980, (Transcript page 65 lines 14-18). 
It is clear from the Complaint and Amended Complaints 
on file herein that Plaintiff-Respondent is alleging a 
breach of the Lease Agreement in question and is stating 
that Defendant-Appellant failed to comply with the terms of 
-6-
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~· 
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the Lease after a termination thereof. However, the parties 
have specifically agreed in the Lease Agreement that 
Defendant-Appellant should have the opportunity of correct-
ing any default for a period of 60 days after written notice 
of default has been given, and Defendant-Appellant was never 
given the opportunity to cure said alleged default. 
The law in connection with contracts seems clear that 
if a contract provides for notice that said notice must be 
given before performance or damages under the contract can 
be enforced. This proposition is clearly set out in 17 Am 
Jur 2d Section 356 at page 794 which states: 
"A contract specifically requiring a notice 
calling for, or a demand for, performance cannot 
be enforced unless a notice or demand provided for 
has either been given or waived." 
also in 17 Am Jur 2d Section 357 at page 796 it states 
"There can be no recovery on a contract specif ical-
ly providing for notice or demand unless the 
notice or demand was given in accordance with the 
terms of the contract.". 
As is clear from the case presently before the court the 
parties very specifically contracted for written notice to 
be given by the Lessor to the Lessee, and that the Lessee 
had the opportunity of curing said default for a period of 
60 days, (Exhibit 1, Section VIII). However, Lessee was not 
given notice prior to the institution of suit, and suit was 
unilaterally filed without complaining with the provisions 
of the Lease Agreement by Plaintiff-Respondent. 
_..,_ 
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The Utah Supreme Court in Bethers -v- Wood, 10 U 2d 
313, 352 P 2d 774 (1960} holds at page 775 in interpretating 
contracts: 
"The correct rule would appear to be that the 
question is to solved by the intent of the parties 
as determined by proper construction of their 
contract.". 
It is evident from the contract in question that the 
parties intended the Lessor to provide written notice to the 
Lessee, and it is clear from the testimony of the Plaintiff-
Respondent, that notice was not given until after the 
institution of suit, (Transcript page 65 lines -14 through 
18) • 
The Utah Supreme Court in Peterson -v- Intermountain 
Capital Corporation, 29 U 2d 271, 508 P 2d 536, (1973), 
recognizance that Defendant-Appellant should be allowed the 
opportunity to perform pursuant to the terms of the contract, 
and in quoting Corbin on Contracts at page 538, the court 
stated: 
"At Section 978 of Corbin on Contracts it is stated: 
'In an action for breach by an unconditional 
repudiation it is still a condition precedent to 
the plaintiff's right to a Judgment for damages 
that he should have the ability to perform all 
such conditions. If he could not or would not 
have performed the substantially equivalent for 
which the defendant's performance was agreed to be 
exchanged, he is given no remedy in damages for 
the Defendants nonperformance or repudiation • 
" 
This proposition is further substantiated by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Bastain vs. Cedar Hills Inv. and Land co. 
623 P 2d 818 (1981) wherein the Utah Supreme Courth held 
that a buyer could not recover damages hec~,~"'~·~ "'-~ +h- ,_ __ 
-8-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
promise being contingent upon conditions that had not 
occurred and it is evident from the case before the court 
that the Lessor did not tender the required written notice 
pursuant to the Lease Agreement in question. The Supreme 
Court in so holding reaffirmed Peterson vs. Intermountain 
Capital Corp. supra. 
Willison on Contracts, Third Edition, Section 887B at 
pages 513, 514, and 515 states: 
"Where notice is required in the contract, the 
nature of the notice will normally be governed by 
the terms expressed or implied, of the agreement 
between the parties In the absence of a 
conflict with law or public policy, parties may 
contract how notice shall be given; when they do 
so contract, the giving of notice by the method 
agreed upon is sufficient whether it results in 
actual notice or not.". 
In the case before the court it is clear that no notice 
was given al though Section VIII on Terminat.ion specifically 
provides how notice is to be given by the Lessor, and that 
the Lessee should have 60 days in which to cure any alleged 
default. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF-RESONDENT DID NOT TENDER CONSIDERATION FOR 
EXECUTION OF THE LEASE IN QUESTION. 
The law of contracts is clear that in order for there 
to be a binding, valid contract consideration must be given. 
The Utah Supreme Court clearly recognizes this proposition 
_q_ 
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of law in General Insurance Company of America -v- Carnicero 
Dynasty Corporation, 545 P 2d 502 (1976) , and states at page 
504: 
"Where consideration is lacking there can be no 
contract. Where consideration fails, there was a 
contract when the agreement was made, but because 
of some superviening cause the promised perform-
ance fails. 0 • 
In the action presently before the court it is clear 
under page 2 of the Lease and as stated pursuant to the 
Lease the Lessor is granting the lodes and veins of the 
property in question. However, the evidence produced at the 
time of trial shows that Plaintif £-Respondent never had 
title to the lodes or veins in question but merely filed on 
the Placer Claims, (Exhibit 14). 
Under page 9 of the Lease in question the Lessors are 
required to record all of the unpatented mining claims 
subject to the Lease in accordance with appropriate State 
and Federal statutes and regulations. However, at the time 
of the trial the evidence clearly showed that the Plaintiff-
Respondents had not filed a notice in conjunction with the 
transfer of interest with the B.L.M. Even as of the date of 
trial no Notice of transfer of interest was filed, (Tran-
script page 72 lines 4 through 7), and a Notice of Interest 
is required to be filed by 43 CFR 3833.3(a) on unpatented 
mining claims. 
From the evidence produced at trial Plaintiffs stated 
that they owned the unpatented mining claims located on 
-10-
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Federal lands prior to October 21, 1976, (~ran~cript page 9 
lines 9 through 13) , and therefore Plaintiff-Respondents 
should have filed all proper documentation with the B.L.M. 
on or before October 22, 1979, and on the following calandar 
years thereafter. 
The Lease at page 9 also provides: 
"The Lessor shall record each and all of the 
unpatented mining claims subject to this lease by 
December 1, 1978 in accordance with the 
appropriate federal statutes and regulations." 
A requirement to file with the B.L.M. is imposed upon 
the owners of unpatiented mining claims pursuant to 43 CFR 
3833.2-1 and it appears that a failure to file an instrument 
or to comply with the federal regulations in connection with 
unpatented mining claims voids title to the claims as stated 
under 43 CFR 3833.4 wherein it states: 
(a) The failure to file an instrument required by 
Section 3833.1-2 a, b, and 3833.2-1 of this title 
within the time periods described herein shall be 
deemed conclusively to be construed as an abandon of 
the mine claim, mill, or tunnel sight, and it shall be 
void."(emphasis added). 
It therefore appears that because of Plaintiff-Respondents 
failure to own the interest granted, and because of the 
failure to perfect the mining claims in question (Exhibit 
14), pursuant to the lease and federal regulations, that 
Plaintiff-Respondents actually had no interest to transfer, 
therefore there was a complete lack of consideration and a 
valid contract could not be entered into between the 
Plaintiff and Defendant. 
The perfecting of title of the claims was a condition 
_,,_ 
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precedent to the performance by Defendant-Appellant as 
discussed in Point I in connection with the Notice require-
ment. In General Insurance Company of America -v- Carnicero 
Dynasty Corporation, supra at page 505 the Utah Supreme 
Court states: 
"However consideration or a substitute thereof 
must be established as part of Plaintiffs prima 
facia case in a contract action." 
This proposition of law is also supported by the 
Supreme Court in Bastian vs. Cedar Hills Inv. and Land Co. 
supra. 
In the action presently before the court, because of 
Plaintiff-Respondents failure to file the proper documenta-
tion, there is no interest owned by Plaintiff-Respondents in 
connection with the mining claims, and the fact that 
Plaintiff-Respondents attempted to lease out lode and vein 
claims upon which he never had title is a complete lack of 
consideration. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT HAD KNOWLEDGE OF THE PLACEMENT OF 
THE OVERBURDEN AND MADE NO ATTEMPT TO HAVE THE SAME REMOVED 
AND MUST BE ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING DAMAGES AS A RESULT OF 
THE PLACEMENT THEREOF. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Thompson vs. Jacobsen 463 p 
2d 801 (1970) has stated that a fundamental principal of 
-12-
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law is that the Plaintiff has a duty to reasonably mitigate 
damages. The Utah Supreme Court in University Club vs. 
Invesco Holding Corporation 504 P 2d 29 (1972) stated: 
"The recognized rule is that where one party 
definitely indicates that he cannot or will not 
perform a condition of a contract, the other is 
not required to uselessly abide time, but may act 
upon the breached condition. Indeed in 
appropriate circumstances he ought to do so to 
mitigate damages."(emphasis added). 
In the action presently before the court it is clear 
that Plaintiff-Respondent was aware of the placement of the 
overburden and made regular trips throughout the area 
(Findings of Fact paragraph 13, Transcript page 54 line 20 
and 21, page 176 lines 18 through 20, page 177 lines 23 
through 25, page 182 lines 17 through 18 pages 174, 176, 177 
and 182), and in fact Defendant-Respondent went further and 
indicated that the methods employed in doing the assement 
work and exploration on the property in question were 
acceptable to the Plaintiff-Respondent (page 38 lines 16 
through 25, page 39 lines 1 through 5). It appears clear 
that in the circumstances presently before the court that 
Plaintiff-Respondent had a duty to mitigate damages but at 
no time has he attempted to mitigate damages as a result of 
the placement of the overburden on the mineral properties in 
question. 
-1 ":t-
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POINT IV 
THE JUDGMENT FOR REMOVAL OF THE OLD OVERBURDEN WAS 
EXCESSIVE. 
The court on the trial held on October 13, 1981 granted 
a Judgment to the Plaintiff for the removal of overburden 
which had been placed upon suspected deposits of aragonite.-
However, from the Transcript it appears that the deposits of 
aragonite uncovered by Defendants exploration could be 
removed (Transcript 115 lines 19 through 24) , but that the 
reason for not removing said deposits of aragonite which had 
been uncovered by the Defendant-Appellant was because of a 
lack of market for the same and the fact that said aragonite 
is located to far from a metropolitan area (Transcript page 
129, 130, 131). 
The Utah Supreme Court in Even Odds, Inc. vs. Nielson 
448 P 2d 709 (1968) at page 711 stated: 
"Speaking generally about damages, the desired 
objective is to evaluate any loss suffered by the 
most direct, practical and accurate method that 
can be employed." 
The Utah Supreme Court in Winters vs. Charles Anthony, Inc. 
586 P 2d 453 (1978) held that ordinarily in regards to 
personal property that the general rule for damages is the 
fair market value or, if there is no demand for the item, 
the recovery is based on actual value. The court further 
stated: 
"The rule is a flexible one that can be modified 
in the interest of fairness." 
-14-
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-
In the action presently before the court there is no 
market for the aragonite in question and the overburden was 
placed by the Defendant-Appellant, with the knowledge of the 
Plaintiff-Respondent (Transcript page 174, 176, 177, and 
182) • It further appears that the placement of the 
overburden was in the logical place for the _same (Transcript 
page 218) • It therefore appears that said overburden was 
placed at the direction of the Plaintiff-Respondent, and 
that the placement was based upon an exploration of the 
properties and not full scaled mining. It therefore appears 
that the placement of the overburden has not damaged the 
Plaintiff-Respondent because there is no market · for the 
aragonite uncovered by Defendant-Appellants activities, and 
that to grant damages as a result of covering up potential 
deposits of aragonite where there is no market for the 
aragonite uncovered seems incomprehensible. 
POINT V 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT SHOULD NOT BE OBLIGATED TO MAKE 
PAYMENT ON THE SALE OF A MOTOR VEHICLE SOLD TO MINING AND 
ENERGY LEASING CORPORATION, A UTAH CORPORATION WITHOUT 
ACKNOWLEDGING SAID OBLIGATION IN WRITING. 
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Utah Code Annotated at 25-5-4 states: 
"In the following cases every agreement shall be 
void unless such agreement, or some note or 
memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by 
the party to be charged therewith: • 
(2) every promise to answer for the debt, default 
or miscarriage of another." 
It is clear (Transcript page 84, lines 2 through 23), 
that the truck in question was being sold to Mining and 
Energy Leasing Corporation, a Utah corporation and at no 
time has Defendant-Appellant signed a written document 
indicating that he would answer for the debts of Mining 
Energy Leasing Corporation (Transcript page 214 lines 25, 
page 215 lines 1, 2). 
SUMMARY 
In summary Defendant-Appellant alleges that Plaintiff-
Respondent did not have standing to bring the action because 
of a failure to comply with the terms of the Contract by 
giving the required written notice, and that said contract 
was void or voidable as a result of a lack of consideration 
pursuant to the terms of the Lease Agreement and therefore 
unenforcable by the Plaintiff-Respondent. Defendant-
Appellant alleges further that the judgment awarded by the 
District Court, as a result of the placement of the 
overburden is excessive in that the poten~ial deposits of 
aragonite allegedly covered by the Defendant-Appellant have 
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:t 
no market value and Plaintiff-Respondent made no attempt to 
mitigate his damages in connection with the placement of 
said overburden. Further that Defendant-Appellant should 
not be responsible for payment of the truck in question as a 
result of not signing a written agreement stating that he 
would answer for the debts or liability of another. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this :( :(_ day of 
1982. 
GERALD M. CONDER 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that two copies of the following Brief 
were hand delivered to Steven Alder, attorney for the 
Plaintiff, at Ten Exchange ?lace, ilOOO, Salt Lake City Utah 
84111, this ;(~day of ~ , 1982. 
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